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pay the respondents upon delivery, there was a distinct contractual
immunity impliedly incorporating the clause in the bus-bill . 32 Again,
however, the decision is inscrutable on this point .
N . E . PALMER
CRIMINAL LAW-HOMICIDE-CONSTRUCTIVE MURDER-CANADIAN
CRIMINAL CODE-SECTION 212(c)-HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF "UN-
LAWFUL OBJECT" .-In Canada, the prosecution is fortunate in
murder cases because it does not have to specify the particular
provision of the Criminal Code' under which it hopes to prove the
guilt of the accused . All that is required in the formal charge is a
reference to that nebulous section 205, a vague, declaratory
legislative provision which defines nothing in particular, describes
no specific ingredients of any offence and prescribes no penalties . In
summary, section 205 tells us that homicide is culpable or not
culpable ; culpable homicide is murder, manslaughter or infanticide .
In most murder cases, the Crown, and the trial judge in due
course, had relied on section 212(a) and (b) and, until quite recently,
section 212(c) was ignored . This situation has changed and that last
sub-section has become quite important, particularly in cases heard
by the Ontario Court of Appeal .
Sections 212 and 213 of the Criminal Code provide detailed
descriptions of murder . The latter section gives a very broad
definition of what used to be called felony-murder (although our
Code has never used the distinction between felony and mis-
demeanour) . Murder in section 213 is defined as a death caused
while committing or attempting to commit one of a catalogue of
crimes most of which are violent in nature (or at least potentially
violent) .
Section 212(a) defines classic, subjective murder which is
committed by persons who cause death when they mean to cause
death or mean to cause bodily harm that they know is likely to cause
death and are reckless whether death ensues or not .
Section 212(b) adds nothing new except that it introduces the
concept of transferred intent .
11Cf. H. M . Humphrey Ltd v . Baxter Hoare & Co . Ltd (1933) . 149 L.T . 603 ;
Britain & Overseas Trading (Bristles) Ltd v . Brook's Wharf & Bull Wharf Ltd,
[1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep . 51, at p . 60 .
*N . E . Palmer, of the Faculty of Law, University of Manchester, United
Kingdom.





Finally, section 212(c), in which we are most interested,
Where a person, for an unlawful object, does anything that he knows or ought
to know is likely to cause death, and thereby causes death to a human being,
notwithstanding that he desires to effect his object without causing death or
bodily harm to any human being.
This description of murder has two ingredients which we do not
find in the other sub-sections of 212 . The definition of mens rea is
broader because there is mention of "ought to know" and there is
the phrase "notwithstanding he desires to effect his object . . ." .
Secondly, the sub-section includes the phrase "for an unlawful
object" .
This last phrase is not defined in the Code . We find similar
expressions in two other sections which have a direct or indirect
connection with homicide . Section 21(2) describes participation of
persons in criminal enterprises and has always been important in
murder;' the sub-section describes liability for two or more persons
"who form an intention in common to carry out an unlawful
purpose . . ." . This provision has been very important in murders
which fall under section 213 but has not caused any relevant
discussion in relation to 212(c) . Section 205 has already been
mentioned . In sub-section (5) of205, culpable homicide is defined to
include death caused "by means of an unlawful act" . Unfortunately,
there is no further explanation in the Code . Given the existence of
sections 205(5), 212(c) and 217 (which provides that "culpable
homicide that is not murder . . . is manslaughter") we could surmise
that culpable homicide by "unlawful act" (or "object"?) could be
either murder or manslaughter.
Before we seek any legislative scheme for a progression of
homicide offences in the Code, we should trace the genesis of
section 212(c) the wording of which has remained unchanged since
1892 .
The conventional wisdom of the history of 1892 Code is that it
was based on the English Draft Code which was written by James
Fitzjames Stephen . This is essentially true although two Canadians,
George Wheelock Burbidge and Robert Sedgewick, made a signifi-
cant and original contribution to the Canadian Code .
Stephen published his Digest of the Criminal Law 3 in 1877 and
then used that work as the basis for the English Draft Code of 1879.
The Digest does not include anything like our section 212(c) .
The closest is found in the article 223 on murder where malice
a E. g ., Regina v. Trinneer, [1970] S .C.R . 638 .
3 A Digest of the Criminal Law (Crimes and Punishments) (1877) .
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aforethought is defined to include "(c) an intent to commit any
felony whatever" . 4 At that time, felony included many crimes which
were not very serious and even more that could not be called
inherently violent . In other words, Stephen was adhering to a strict
interpretation of the felony-murder rule . The illustrations which
accompany article 223 mostly describe clear acts of violence such as
arson, explosives and serious assault . There are two questionable
examples ; Coke's old chestnut about "shooting at a domestic fowl,
intending to steal it, and accidentally killing B"s and "A, a thief,
pursued by B, a policeman, who wishes to arrest A, trips up B, who
is accidentally killed" . s The second illustration is a clear statement
of a "crime control" policy because a policeman was killed . This
situation is covered by section 213 and does not concern us in an
examination of section 212(c) .
The first example has been thoroughly discounted by many
commentators, including Mr. Justice Stephen who explained the
fowl case to the jury in Serné:'
. . . he was to be accounted guilty of murder, because the act was done in the
commission of a felony . I very much doubt, however, whether that is really the
law . . . the definition of the law which makes it murder to kill by an act done
in the commission of a felony might and ought to be narrowed . . . instead of
saying that any act done with intent to commit a felony and which causes death
amounts to murder, it would be reasonable to say that any act known to be
dangerous to life and likely in itself to cause death done for the purpose of
committing a felony which caused death, should be murder .
Some other illustrations furnished by Stephen describe deaths
caused by unlawful acts which include assault (without intending to
kill or do grievous bodily harm), failing to cover a mine shaft, and
throwing stones down a coal mine . The authorities cited by Stephen
suggest that such killings would only be manslaughter .
Stephen has often been imagined as a Draconian retributivist .
This is partly due to his attitudes toward malice and revenge . He
supported a conviction of murder (and a mandatory death penalty)
for those who killed while committing felonies of violence . He
believed that such persons showed a clear disposition for "evil" and
should be punished accordingly . In lesser cases, where there was
merely implied malice, he was quite prepared to see a verdict of
manslaughter . Such an amelioration did not originate with Stephen .
Forty years before the English Draft Code, the Criminal Law
Commissioners, in effect a parliamentary committee, complained in
'Ibid., p. 144.
'Ibid ., p. 146.
'Ibid., p. 147.





1839 that implied malice was "loosely defined or rather is not
defined at all" . $ The Commissioners had great difficulty in coming
to a definition, observing that the borderline between murder and
something less would depend on the facts. They were attracted by
Foster's formulation of mens mala-` `the heart regardless of social
duty" which they further described as a:
. . . figurative expression used to denote the criminal apathy or indifference
with which an act is wilfully done which puts human life in peril . Whether such
a peril be wilfully occasioned is a question not of law but of fact, depending on
a consideration of the nature ofthe act done, the circumstances under which it
is done, the probability that the act done, under those circumstances would be
fatal to life, and the consciousness on the part of the offender that such peril
would ensue. 9
A little later, the Report condensed this statement of "malice"
to "the mere question whether the offender, being conscious of the
risk, wilfully exposed life to danger" . to
In turn, article 10 of a Digest drafted by the Commission simply
defined murder as a killing "of malice aforethought" ."
"Malice aforethought" in murder is defined in-later articles as
"voluntary" killing which in turn is described as a death resulting
from "any act or unlawful omission done or omitted with intent to
kill or do great bodily harm to anyother person, or whensoever any
one wilfully endangers the life of another by any act or unlawful
omission likely to kill . . ." .12
The Commissioners preserved the felony-murder rule but with
some circumscription :
The killing is also of malice aforethought whensoever one in committing or
attempting to commit any felony with force or violence to the person or
dwelling-house of any other, or in burning or attempting to burn such
dwelling-house or in committing or attempting to commit any felony from
which danger mayensue to the life of any other person, shall happen to kill any
other person . 13
e Fourth Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners on Criminal Law (London,
1839), reprinted in the Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers ;
Reports from The Royal Commission on the Criminal Law with Appendices and
Index, 1834-1841 (Shannon, 1971), pp . xxii and 254. (The references represent the
internal pagination ofthe individual reports and the overall pagination ofthe reprint.)
9 1bid .
'0Ibid ., pp . xxv and 257.
"Ibid ., pp . xxxiii and 265.
12 Ibid .
13 Art. 53, at pp . xl and 272. Taschereau in his treatise on Canadian criminal
law defined "malice aforethought" : " . . . it is not to be understood merely in the
sense of a principle of malevolence to particulars, but as meaning that the fact has
been attended with such circumstances as are the ordinary symptoms of a wicked,
depraved, and malignant spirit, a heart regardless of social duty, and deliberately
bent upon mischief. And in general any formed design of doing mischief may be
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This definition limited felony-murder to life-endangering acts .
Article 67 of the Report, in defining manslaughter, accentuated the
Commission's desire to limit murder because the lesser form of
homicide is described as death resulting "from any unlawful act or
unlawful omission, attended with risk of hurt to the person of
another" . 14
These recommendations never reached the statute book . The
English Draft Code 1s was similarly ignored . The 1879 attempt to
codify the criminal law included a sub-section similar to section
212(c) of the Canadian Criminal Code with one important differ-
ence . The proviso at the end of section 212(c) of the Canadian law
states "notwithstanding that he desires to effect his object without
causing death or bodily harm to any human being" while the Draft
Code ends with the words "though he may have desired that his
object should be effected without hurting anyone" . 16 There seems a
difference in quality here so long as we assume "bodily harm" is a
stronger phrase than "hurting anyone" .
The wording of the Draft Code is surprising in light of the
earlier Criminal Law Commissioners' Report and the formulation in
Stephen's Digest . The Report of the Criminal Code Commissioners,
who included Stephen, is no more enlightening . Indeed the remarks
found there are positively confusing and show a disturbing disparity
between the spirit of the Report and the letter of the Draft .
The Commissioners wisely decided to abandon "malice
aforethought" because it was misleading . In particular, the Report
commented that "the inaccuracy of the definition is still more
apparent when we find it laid down that a person may be guilty of
murder who had no intention to kill or injure the deceased or any
other person, but only to commit some other felony, and the injury to
the individual was a pure accident . This conclusion was arrived at by
means of the doctrine of constructive or implied malice . In this case
as in the case of other legal fictions it is difficult to say how far the
doctrine extended" . 17
In the process of rejecting malice aforethought, the Commis-
sioners noted that the term included the bare intent "to commit any
felony" . They admitted that this might be thought too broad but they
cited, in support, Foster who recited Coke's famous fowl example.
They obviously had not studied Foster as carefully as their 1839
"Op . cit ., footnote 8 . pp. xIii and 274 .
is Report of The Royal Commission Appointed to Consider The Law Relating to
Indictable Offences : With An Appendix Containing A Draft Code embodying the
Suggestions of the Commissioners (London, 1879) .
"Ibid ., s . 174(d) .




predecessors. They redeemed themselves in the actual Draft by
limiting "felony-murder" in section 175 to cases where the accused
meant to inflict "grievous bodily injury for the purpose of
facilitating the commission" of a limited range of offences almost
the same as those now found in section 213 of the Canadian Criminal
Code.
There is no explicit explanation of what was to become section
212(c) of our Code although there is a suggestion in these remarks of
the Commissioners:
For practical purposes we can make no distinction between a man who shoots
another through the head expressly meaning to kill him . . . and a man who,
intendingfor some object of his own, to stop the passage of a railway train,
contrives an explosion of gunpowder or dynamite under the engine, hoping
indeed that death may not be caused, but determined to effect his purpose
whether it is so caused or not.18
The 1839 Report had not envisaged anything as wide as this but
the Commissioners at that time were living in a period of
comparative calm . The years between 1839 and 1879 had seen the
1848 convulsions in Europe, the most active years of the Chartists,
the effects of trade unionism, the fears of anarchism and the
activities of the Fenians. These events, and the political climate they
created, provoked a response epitomised in the worship of force and
might be seen in Carlyle's writings ."
The Fenian "menace" may not have been the most serious
threat but the reported cases might suggest otherwise . In the decade
preceding the 1879 Code, there had been at least two cases with
Fenian overtones. The 1867 case of Regina v. Allen and Others 2o
would probably now fall under section 213 of our Code although
there was some question about the legality of the warrants on which
the alleged murderers of a policeman had been held. This may
explain the partiality for the "unlawful object" (falling short of a
felony of violence) provision although this seems specious because
the defendant's behaviour was clearly recklessly murderous under
what is now section 212(a) of our Code . Perhaps it is not
coincidental that one of the judges on the Allen case was Blackburn
who presided over the 1879 Commission .
The second Fenian case was closer to the railway explosion
example given in the 1879 Report of the Commissioners . In Regina
v. Desmond andOthers ,21the six accused were charged with murder
of aprisoner who had been killed when the conspirators had blown a
"Ibid., italics added.
is Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830-1870 (1959), Ch . 9 .
2° (1867), 17 L.T.N.S . 222 (Lancaster Special Commission).
21 (1868), 11 Cox C.C . 146 (Central Crim . Ct).
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hole in the wall of the Clerkenwell House of Detention to liberate a
colleague named Burke . One of the conspirators, Barrett, was
convicted of murder and once again one of the judges Cockburn
C.J ., was to have a decisive role in the fate of the English Draft
Code . Cockburn C .J . had relied upon the fowl example to convict
Barrett and was reported as saying :
If aperson seeking to commit a felony should in the prosecution of thatpurpose
cause, although it might be unintentionally, the death of another, that, by the
law of England, was murder . 22
Once again, Barrett could have been convicted under section
212(a) of the Canadian Criminal Code or its English Draft Code
equivalent . The extension found in section 212(c) was quite
unnecessary .
Canada had also had its Fenian scares and perhaps this
explained the inclusion of the "unlawful object" provision . In
addition, the Macdonald Government was somewhat preoccupied
with railways at the time of the passage of the 1892 Code and this
may have added to the attraction of section 174(d) of the English
Draft Code.23
As stated earlier, George Wheelock Burbidge was one of the
drafters of the 1892 Canadian Code . He was a Judge of the
Exchequer Court at the time but had previously been Deputy
Minister of Justice . In 1890, he had published A Digest of the
Criminal Law of Canada," which was expressly modelled on
Stephen's Digest . The description of murder in Burbidge's work is
an exact copy of Stephen's, including the latter's illuminating
appendices . 11 Therefore the definition of murder in Burbidge
22 The Times newspaper, April 28th, 1868, cited by Stephen, op . cit ., footnote
3, pp . 160-161, note 4, emphasis added . The Clerkenwell explosion case was cited
with approval by Stephen J . in Serné, supra, footnote 7, at p . 314.
83 This provision (s . 174(d) or 212(c)) does not appear in the Criminal Code
(Judiciable Offences) Bill of 1878, Bill No . 178 introduced on May 14th, 1878 .
If we look at Bill No . 170 introduced on May 12th, 1879, we find that s . 174 is
identical to s . 174 of the Draft Code examined by the Commissioners .
Similarly, it is also found unaltered in Bill 2 called Criminal Code Bill dated
February 6th, 1880 .
24 A Digest ofthe Criminal Law ofCanada (Crimes and Punishments) : Founded
by Permission on SirJames Fitzjames Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law (1890) .
25 Stephen, op . cit ., footnote 3, p . 360 said : "Foster to some extent mitigates
the barbarous rule laid down by Coke as to unintentional personal violence, by
confining it to cases in which the unintentional violence is offered in the commission
of a felony . This rule has in modern times had a singular and unexpected effect .
When Coke and Hale wrote, the infliction of hardly any bodily injury short ofa maim
was a felony . Cutting with intent to disfigure was made felony by the Coventry Act ;
shooting was made felony by what was called the Black Act ; and by later statutes it
has been provided that the intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm in any way




includes "an intent to commit any felony whatever' 126 but no
mention of an "unlawful object" provision although it does find its
way into Sir John Thompson's Code of 1892 . . -
When Crankshaw published his first commentaries on the Code
in 1894, 27 there are no cases which relate to what is now section
212(c) . 21 The illustrations which could possibly relate to unlawful
acts or objects are all applicable to section 213 29 (and the felonies of
robbery, arson or choking) or section 212(a)(ii) .
In the 1902 edition, Crankshaw does offer more enlightenment
but the discussion is found in the manslaughter section." He
discussed Regina v. Salmon 31 and Regina v. Archer32 and about the
latter case, he said:
The last case approaches very closely to the idea of murder, as defined in
section 227(d) which makes it murder if the offender,for any unlawful object,
does an act which he knows or ought to know . . . etc. A distinction, however,
may be drawn from the fact that in [Archer] the object of the accused-that of
obtaining possession of the gun which was his own property-was not an
unlawful object, although the means used, attempting to regain possession of it
by force, were unlawful . 31
The writer creates some confusion because he seems to suggest
that homicide under section 227(d) may be manslaughter . In a
general description of the difference between manslaughter and
murder, Crankshaw said :
. . . if, by an unlawful act . . . one causes the death of another, meaning to
cause death, it will be murder . If, however, in doing the unlawful act . . . one
kills another, not meaning to kill any one, it will, in general, be manslaughter
only . It may, however, even then-notwithstanding the absence ofintention to
kill-be murder, under some circumstances ; as, where the offender's intention
is to cause some bodily injury which he knows to be likely to cause death; and
he is reckless whether death ensues or not. And so, if a person, without
intending to hurt anyone, proceed, for some unlawful object-say with the
object of robbing a bank-to do an act (such as the blowing open, by
explosives, of a safe or vault), whereby the watchman, who happens to be in an
adjoining office, is killed, the question would arise whether the act of blowing
intent to do grievous, as distinguished from minor, bodily harm being essential to
malice aforethought now rests on statutory authority, for no one can intentionally
inflict on another grievous bodily harm without committing a felony, and to cause
death by a felonious act is murder." Burbidge, op . cit ., ibid ., p. 518, reproduced
this passage .
26 Ibid ., p. 217.
27 Crankshaw, The Criminal Code of Canada (1894) .
23 Then s . 227(d) of the 1892 Code .
zs Then s. 228 of the 1892 Code .
11 Then s. 230 of the 1892 Code .
31 (1880), 6 Q.B .D . 79 (Ct of Crown Cases Reserved).
32 (1857), 1 F. & F. 351, 175 E.R . 750 (Norfolk Circuit Ct).
33 Op . cit ., footnote 27, p. 247, italics in original .
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open the safe or vault was an act which the accused knew or ought to have
known to be likely to cause death."
Most of the cases cited by Crankshaw fall under the present
section 213 . 35 In the section on manslaughter, he did give one
example which could come within section 212(c) . He described the
case of a workman, on the top of a house under construction,
throwing stones or other materials which kill a person below. This
seems a reasonably clear case in the "unlawful object" category but
Crankshaw said it could be murder, manslaughter or misadventure
"according to whether there is an entire absence of care, or
according to the degree of the precautions taken and of the necessity
of any such precautions . If the workman threw the stones etc .
without giving any previous warning to persons passing beneath, and
at a time when it was likely for a person to be passing, it would be
murder' 1 .36
In the third edition of 1910, Crankshaw is at last able to cite one
Canadian case to illustrate section 212(c) . This case, The King v .
Chisholm 31 is inappropriate because it is a clear case of manslaughter
(resulting in a suspended sentence) . The English cases cited,
including Serné (which resulted in an acquittal), are equally
uninstructive because they are all illustrations of manslaughter or
less .
The other well-known commentator was Tremeear whose
second edition" appeared in 1908 . In explanation of section 212(c),
he cited two English cases, Regina v . Jones 39 which was another
clear case of manslaughter and Regina v . Weston" which has some
factual resemblance to Regina v . Tennant and Naccarato . 11
The jury in Weston returned a finding that the "gun was levelled
at the deceased unnecessarily under the circumstances, but without
any intention of discharging it, and that it went off accidentally", 4z
which Cockburn C .J . construed to be a verdict of manslaughter .
34 76id ., p . 244, italics in original .
35 Then 3 . 228 of the 1892 Code .
36 Op . cit ., footnote 27, p . 245 . The only authorities cited are Foster, Coke and
Hale .
37 (1908), 14 C.C.C . 15 (Halifax Co . Ct) .
33 The Criminal Code and the Law of Criminal Evidence in Canada (2nd ed .,
1908) .
3s (1874), 12 Cox C .C . 628 (Oxford Circuit) .
'° (1879), 14 Cox C.C . 346 (Crown Court) .
"(1976), 23 C.C .C . (2d) 80 (Ont . C.A .) .
42 Supra, footnote 40, at p . 352 . An editor of this case had added, ibid . : "It
must not be supposed that the Lord Chief Justice intended to lay down anything
contrary to the law laid down in many cases-that even a blow in self-defence will




A Canadian case43 had finally been decided which specifically
raised the question of "unlawful object" homicide, although it was
hardly necessary because the facts fell squarely under the protection
of section 213 (or even 212(a)). The facts had Fenian overtones
although its resemblance to Regina v. Allen was merely fortuitous .
The accused was being returned to jail in a cab after a trial for
burglary. Some unknown persons threw revolvers into the cab and in
the consequent struggle, a police officer was killed . The trial judge
Falconbridge C.J.K.B . instructed the jury about the law of
participation (under what is now section 21(2)) and said that it was
clearly murder where the accused acted "with the intention to
commit an unlawful act and with the resolution or determination to
overcome all opposition by force . . ."4a . The trial judge referred to
no particular section of the Code but the five man Ontario Court of
Appeal made it tolerably clear that the accused's murder conviction
should be affirmed because he was a party to the transaction and was
attempting to escape from lawful custody which was an offence
mentioned in the felony-murder provision of what is now section
213 .4s
Tremeear'S 46 comment at this juncture was:
If a man does an illegal act although its immediate purpose maynot be to take
life, yet if it be such that life is necessarily endangered by it and the doerknows
or believes that life is likely to be sacrificed by it, it is murder .
After a decade, there was no Canadian decision which had used
section 212(c) . Rex v. Elnick, Clements and Burdie` was another
case in this genre. The judgment of the full bench of the Manitoba
Court of Appeal is a very scholarly one but it was, in effect,
superfluous because the trial judge had insisted upon instructing the
jury on both sections 212 and 213 although only the latter was
necessary as it was a clear case of murder in furtherance of an armed
robbery . In addition to explaining those two sections, the trial judge
had also told the jury that if the "accused did not intend to fire the
gun at all, his offence would be manslaughter because, if a man,
violence causing death. . . . This was intended to be conveyed . . . with the present
case, that if the prisoner intentionally fired the gun not from such alarm as suggested,
but on account of ill-will, then the act was murder . The jury in their verdict [of
manslaughter] negatived the state of alarm suggested, but also negatived intention,
and found that the gun went off by accident ."
43 The King v. Rice (1902), 5 C.C.C . 509 (Out . C.A.) .
"Ibid., at p. 512.
as Ibid ., at p. 517, per OslerJ.A., whocommented that constructive murder was
"a phrase which has no legal meaning" .
46OP . cit., footnote 38, pp . 200-201. This is taken from Cockburn C.J . in
Barrett, supra, footnote 22 .
"(1920), 33 C.C.C . 174 (Man . C.A .) .
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while doing an unlawful act, kills another, although he did not intend
to do him any hurt, it is manslaughter' 1 .48
This case is complicated by the fact that the Court of Appeal
decided that the substantive common law still applied in Manitoba .
Consequently, the court examined, and implicitly approved, the fowl
case, doubted the liberality of Stephen J.'s direction in Serné, cited
Cockburn C.J . in Barrett, but finally decided that these authorities
were unnecessary because the act being committed by Elnick and his
confederates, which resulted in the victim's death, was "an act of
violence done in the course or pursuance of a felony involving
violence' 1 .4' This decision was made very soon after the House of
Lords decision in D.P.P . v . Beard" and the Manitoba court decided
that the trial judge in Elnick had misdirected the jury because
"Elnick was engaged in the commission of a crime of violence and
his intention to discharge the revolver cannot be regarded separately
from his avowed intention to commit robbery" . 51
Once again, we see that precise direction of the jury in terms of
section 213 would have obviated the difficulties and have shown the
very limited use of section 212(c) . Indeed, until the rash of recent
decisions on this latter section, the only situation in which section
212(c) appears to be needed is the case of abortion . The Manitoba
Court of Appeal had serious doubts about the "extraordinary view"
expressed in two English cases52 of abortion followed by the death of
the woman where it was laid down that a jury may find a verdict of
manslaughter "if the death was so remote a contingency that no
reasonable man would have taken it into his consideration' 1 .53 A
Quebec court examined this problem in the 1948 case of Molleur v.
The King. 54
The appellant doctor, convicted of murder, in Molleur had
claimed, quite rightly, that section 259(d), that is the present section
212(c) was the only description of murder in the Code which could
apply to his case of a death arising out of an illegal abortion . He
argued that section 259(d) only applied to an "illegal act involving
personal violence" and that it was "not enough to know that the
unlawful act [sic] is generally dangerous, but it is necessary to know
that it is dangerous in a particular case"." E .M . McDougall J .
48 Ibid ., at p. 177.
49 Ibid ., at p. 187.
eo 119201 A. C. 479 (H .L.) .
11 Supra, footnote 47, at pp . 188-189.
"Regina v. Whitmarsh (1898), 62 J. P. 711 ;Rex v. Lumley (1912), 22 CoxC .C.
635 (Central Crim . Ct) .
"Rex v. Elnlck, supra, footnote 47, at p. 186 .
54 (1948), 93 C.C.C . 36 (Que . K.B ., App. Side).




declined to answer this issue because he was content to reduce the
crime to manslaughter on his interpretation of "likely" in the
sub-section . He adopted the words of Anglin J . in the enigmatic case
of Graves that it would only be murder if the death "was, under the
circumstances, such a natural or probable consequence of their
conduct that the defendants should have anticipated it" .ss The doctor
would have to know or should have known of the danger when he
undertook the operation and as this was not proved, it was only
manslaughter .
Three Australian states s' have adopted various forms of the
English Draft Code, including something very like section 212(c).
That country's highest court58 has examined section 302(2) of the
Queensland Criminal Code which provides that it is murder "if death
is caused by means of an act done in the prosecution of an unlawful
purpose which act is of such a nature as to be likely to endanger
human life . . ." . Dixon J . decided that this sub-section had no
application in a case where the accused hadassaulted the deceased in
such a way that death had resulted . The judge criticised the jury
direction because it was "founded on the view that the assault on the
deceased woman constituted at once the unlawful purpose and the
dangerous act" . es .In any case, if this view is incorrect, Dixon J.
considered the direction wrong because the trial judge "gave a
direction that if the prisoner unlawfully assaulted the deceased
woman, in such a way as to be likely to endanger her life and her
death resulted, it amounted to murder. This we regard as a serious
misdirection because of the absence of any reference to intent" ."
Admittedly the Queensland provision is not identical to the
Canadian Code section 212(c) but we should note that the "unlawful
purpose" is given a justly limited meaning. In addition, Dixon J. is
telling us that the equivalent of section 212(c) must not be treated as
constructive murder, or worse, a form of misdemeanour-murder .
se Graves v . The King (1913), 47 S .C .R . 568, at p . 584 .
57 Queensland, Criminal Code Act 1899, 63 Viet., No. 9, s . 302(2) : "If death is
caused by means of an act done in the prosecution of an unlawful purpose, which act
is of such a nature as to be likely to endanger human life . . . it is material that the
offender did not intend to hurt any person ." Western Australia, Criminal Code,
Reprinted Act 1956, is identical to the above provision .
Tasmania, Criminal Code Act 1924, s . 157(c) provides that it is murder "if the
offender for any unlawful object does an act that he knows to be likely to cause death
and thereby kills any person though he may have desired that his object should be
effected without hurting anyone" .
58 Hughes v . The King, [1950-19511 Qd S.R . 237 (Aust. High Ct) .
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The Australian courts have strengthened this impression in two
subsequent decisions . s l
In the last five years, Canadian courts have reviewed a number
of cases under section 212(c) . Regina v. Tennant and Nacearato 62
led off the brigade in a thoughtful judgment of the Ontario Court of
Appeal . The court rejects the argument made in Hughes (and many
other cases) that an assault cannot be the "unlawful object" for the
purposes of section 212(c) . The learned judges seem to think that any
other interpretation would defeat the purposes of the sub-section . At
first, they appear to be applying a more stringent test under section
212(c) and yet they immediately follow it with this obscure passage :
We are, nonetheless, of the view that s .212(c) ought not to be given an
interpretation which permits foreseeability under s.212(c) to be substituted for
the intent required under s .212(a)(i) and (ii) in cases where personal injury is
not inflicted for afurther unlawful object . To hold otherwise would largely
nullify the provisions of the section with respect to the necessity for proof of
the requisite intent to kill or to inflict bodily harm which the offender knows is
likely to cause death in order to constitute murder (apart from the limited class
of case falling within a more stringent definition of murder) . Accordingly,
s .212(c) is not applicable where death is caused by an assault which is not
shown to have been committed for the purpose of achieving some other
unlawful object . It is, however, applicable where death is caused by a separate
act which the accused ought to have anticipated was likely to result in death,
and which was committed to achieve some further unlawful object; that
unlawful object may be an assault . 11
The judges' "unlawful object" argument seems no stronger
here but if we ignore that particular problem, is the court saying
anything more than the naens rea needed in section 212(a) must also
be proved for a charge of murder based on section 212(c)? Perhaps
the "unlawful object" issue has obscured the problem . We might
have all been more convinced if that phrase had been qualified by
such explicit words as "inherently violent" . This argument could
certainly be made as Naccarato was wielding a gun. Then again, if
we are dealing with accused persons wielding loaded guns, which are
by definition dangerous, then we could argue, once again, that
section 212(c) is unnecessary and guilt should be obtained under
section 212(a) . Is this implied in this passage from the judgment? :
The jury should then have been told that if they had a reasonable doubt that the
gun was discharged accidentally and if they were not satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the appellant Naccarato procured and used the gun for an
unlawful object and knew or ought to have known that his use of the gun in the
circumstances was likely to cause death, they must acquit him of murder . But
they must then consider whether or not he was guilty of manslaughter. When
"Rex v . Brown and Brian, [1949] Viet . L .R . 179 (Viet . Full Ct) ; Regina v .
Gould and Barnes, [19601 Qd R . 283 (Qd Ct of Crim . App .) .
82 Supra, footnote 41 .




death is accidentally caused by the commission of an unlawful act which any
reasonable person would inevitably realize must subject another person to, at
least, the risk of some harm resulting therefrom, albeit not serious harm, that is
manslaughter . 64
The same court has further examined this problem in Regina v.
Zee Wolfe. ss A conviction of murder was quashed and a new trial
ordered. Zuber J .A . makes it quite clear, by a circuitous route, that
there will be no more interpretations of "unlawful object" which are
as broad as the one in Tennant and Nacaratto . He viewed that
decision and Graves" as "high-water marks of the construction and
application of [212(c)] and should not be construed as points of
departure" . 67 The Ontario Court of Appeal was bound by the
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Graves and managed to
distinguish Tennant andNacaratto on the rather doubtful basis that
the accused in that case entered into a conspiracy before the killing.
Zuber J .A . criticised the application of the "unlawful object"
criterion because it would subject the accused's "mental processes
to an unrealistic dissection" . 68
Unfortunately, Zuber J.A . did not help us very much in our
search for mens rea necessary for section 212(c). The Court of
Appeal hesitated to pursue this issue because of the new trial but
Zuber J.A . did imply that the sub-section is not meant to create
constructive murder. His Lordship said:"
. . . it does not appear that in this case the possession, pointing or using a
firearm . . . can be the unlawful object contemplated by s.212(c) . . . .
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The jury was told, in effect, that if De Wolfe was engaged in the
commission of an unlawful act which he knew or ought to have known was
likely to cause death, and thereby caused death, he could be guilty of murder
pursuant to s.212(c) . . . . This is not the law, and this instruction was a serious
misdirection .
We shall have to wait for further enlightenment because this
"serious misdirection" is very similar to the passage from Tennant
andNaccarato quoted earlier although the latter judges do talk about
"Ibid ., at p. 96 .
ss (1977), 31 C.C.C . (2d) 23 (Ont . C.A .) .
IB Supra, footnote 56.
s' Supra, footnote 65, at p . 29 .
68 Ibid ., at p. 30 .
"Ibid., at p. 26 . Emphasis in original .
De Wolfe was followed in Regina v . Ritchie (1976), 31 C.C .C . (2d) 208 (Ont .
C.A .) . On the question of unlawful object, see Regina v . Messarobba, [1974] 8
W.W.R . 191 (Alta Sup. Ct, App. Div .) ; Regina v . Quaranta (1975), 24 C.C.C . (2d)
109 (Ont . C.A .) ; Regina v . Desmoulin (1976), 30 C .C.C . (2d) 517 (Ont. C.A .) . The
earlier cases of Regina v . Blackmore (1967), 1 C.R.N.S . 286 (N.S . Sup. Ct), and
Downey v . The Queen, [1971] N.Z.L.R . 97 (N.Z.C.A.) were not approved inRegina
v . Tennant and Nacaratto .
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onus, place emphasis on acquittal rather than guilt and refer to the
use of the gun "in the circumstances" .
We must seriously question the need for section 212(c) in
murders where the accused's behaviour is inherently or potentially
dangerous . Such cases should attract liability under the mental
element of recklessness found in section 212(a) . Sub-section (c)
should not be used to stretch manslaughter into murder .
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